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Pope: Bail Pending Appeal: How Much Discretion

CASE COMMENTS
BAIL PENDING APPEAL: HOW MUCH DISCRETION?*
Waller v. State, 208 So. 2d 147 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968)
Defendant, a Negro civil rights activist, was convicted of grand larceny
for removing from the city hall of St. Petersburg, Florida, a mural that
allegedly depicted Negroes grotesquely., The trial court denied bail pending
appeal because defendant did not have sufficient "respect for the law."2 On
appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal 3 HELD, that since the trial court
found as a matter of law that the appeal was taken in good faith, that the
defendant would probably not flee the jurisdiction to evade punishment,
and that "the term of imprisonment is not so short as would render nugatory
the right to appeal," 4 bail must be granted pending appeal. 5
Although the right to bail is not specifically guaranteed by the United
States Constitution,6 the tradition of pretrial bail is a right deeply ingrained
in American society.7 A process of interest balancing is apparent in the idea
of bail. The defendant, who is presumed innocent prior to conviction, has
an interest in personal freedom. This interest is balanced against society's
interest in a guaranteed appearance at trial. 8 Upon conviction the presumption of innocence is extinguished. There remains, nevertheless, a reluctance
to imprison an individual until his case is ruled upon by a court of last resort.
This reluctance, together with society's demand for punishment of convicted
criminals, creates a tension that seeks resolution. 9
*Editor's Note: This Case Comment was awarded the first George W. Milam Award as
the most outstanding Case Comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the spring quarter
1968. The award was established through the kind generosity of the firm of Milam, Ramsay,
Martin 8- Ade of Jacksonville, Florida, in memory of the senior partner of that firm and

will be given quarterly.
1. Brief for Appellant at 2, 28, Waller v. State, 208 So. 2d 147 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
2. State v. Waller, No. 16,743 (6th Cir. Fla. Jan. 11, 1968). The finding of insufficient
respect for the law was predicated upon the probability that defendant would again commit
the same offense if the City of St. Petersburg replaced the mural in the city hall.
3. 208 So. 2d 147 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
4. Id.
5. Id. The court ruled that lack of respect for the law was relevant only insofar as it
indicated whether defendant was likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court.
6. The eighth amendment states only that "Excessive bail shall not be required." U.S.
CONsr. amend. VIII.
7. FED. R. Cim. P. 46 (a) (1) now embodies an absolute right to bail in noncapital
federal offenses. This right was established by statute as early as the Judiciary Act of
1789. Over thirty states presently guarantee that: "all persons shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the
presumption great." See the appendix to Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70
YALE L.J. 966, 977 (1961). In Florida, this right is guaranteed by FLA. CONsT. Decl. of
Rights §9.
8. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). See also Sullivan, Proposed Rule 46 and
the Right to Bail, 31 GEo. WAsn. L. Rrv. 919, 921 (1963); Note, supra note 7, at 969.
9. See generally Note, Bail Pending Appeal in the Federal Courts, 32 U.Y.U.L. Ray. 557,
558 (1957).
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In 1939, Florida established by statute10 that persons accused of noncapital
offenses are entitled to pretrial bail as a matter of right, but that bail after
conviction "may be granted at the discretion of either the trial or appellate
court."'" Prior to 1939, this rule had been developed in Florida by judicial
decision based upon the Florida Constitution.12 In Younghans v. State3 the
Florida supreme court noted that no "standard of judicial action" had previously been set by which lower courts could be "guided in the exercise of
their discretion as to admitting to bail after conviction."' 4 The court then
set forth three standards for lower courts to use: (1) "if an appeal is taken
'merely for delay, bail should be refused but, if taken in good faith,
on
grounds not frivolous but fairly debatable, in view of the decisions of the
Supreme Court, then petitioners should be admitted to bail'"15; (2) "if there
are circumstances to indicate that the accused will flee and thus evade
punishment if his conviction is affirmed, the trial judge may properly exercise
his discretion against the allowance of bail";16 (3) "where the term of
imprisonment imposed is short, the trial court might also consider whether
the denial of bail would render nugatory the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction."' 7 Since in the present case these three elements were expressly not found, and yet bail was denied, the present decision squarely raises
the issue of whether a court may still deny bail pending appeal even though
the Younghans tests are met. This issue has not been raised in Florida since
adoption of the Florida Appellate Rules in 1957.18 Since the Younghans
tests were made mandatory for trial courts, the few cases that have reached
the appellate level have been decided either upon one of the Younghans
10.

FLA. STAT.

§903.01 (1967).

11. Id.
12. Stalnaker v. State, 126 Fla. 407, 171 So. 226, (1936); Ex parte McDaniel, 97 So. 317,
86 Fla. 145 (1923); Miller v. State, 15 Fla. 575 (1876). Stalnaker at 408 held "all persons
shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident
or the presumption great," applied only to bail sought before indictment and trial. FLA.
CONgs. Decl. of Rights §9. Thus, the Declaration of Rights did not deprive the court of its
discretion over bail pending appeal.
13. 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956).
14. Id. at 310.
15. The quoted material within the quotation was taken by the court from United
States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 662 (7th Cir. 1926). Younghans also indicated that "the
character of the case, the trial, and the assignments of errors" may be used to determine
the issues of frivolity and delay. Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1956).
16. The court sets out a number of factors that may also be considered concerning an
individual's temptation to flee the jurisdiction: "(1) the habits of the individual as to
respect for the law, (2) his local attachments to the community . . . (3) the severity of the
punishment imposed for the offense, and any other circumstances relevant to the question
of whether the person would be tempted to remove himself from the jurisdiction of the
court" (emphasis added). Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1956). Note the implication that an individual could have a strong disrespect for the law, but that this would
not be grounds for denial of bail as long as there was no threat of flight from the jurisdiction.
17. 90 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1956).
18. FLA. App. R. 6.15 (b) provides: "The sufficiency of an application to the lower court
for bail pending appeal shall be tested by applying the principles laid down in Younghans
v. State ......
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tests19 or upon other, technical grounds 20 not within the scope of Younghans.
The treatment of the Younghans tests by the Second District Court of
Appeal in the instant decisions' is very restrictive. The effect of the court's
holding is that bail pending appeal is mandatory if the Younghans tests are
met. This raises a serious question of whether such a restrictive view of
Younghans is adequate to balance the interests of society against those of the
individual. If a defendant met the tests of Younghans as interpreted in the
present case, he would have to be released on bail pending appeal even if
he threatened the principal witnesses in any new trial involving defendant; 22
if defendant would in all probability reenter the business of wholesale narcotics sales while on bail;2s if defendant were a narcotics addict and there
were no provisions for treatment available to him; 24 or if defendant had

committed an atrocious offense that he would be likely to repeat if released.2 5
19. Dawkins v. State, 205 So. 2d 691 (Ist D.CA. Fla.), aff1'd, Dawkins v. Crevasse, 209
So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1968) (appeal frivolous because of clear case of contempt of court). On
appeal, Dawkins v. Crevasse, Civ. Action No. 1384 (Fed. Dist. Ct. NMD. Fla., Jan. 24, 1968),
the court applied the federal standard that even in the absence of "frivolity" the court still
may exercise its sound discretion to deny bail. See discussion at note 29 infra. The court
affirmed the denial of bail by the state courts on the ground that "there was a reasonable
basis for the trial court's conclusion that the granting of bail pending appeal would be
disruptive to the orderly operation of that court." This approach to a standard for bail
pending appeal is completely different from the approach taken by the court in the
present case and is discussed at note 26 infra. On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the holding of the federal district court in Dawkins was
overruled, and bail was granted pending disposition of the appeal on the merits. Dawkins
v. Crevasse, 391 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1968); Brooks v. State, 172 So. 2d 876 (lst D.C.A. Fla.
1965) (no abuse of discretion in light of the fact that defendant was a fugitive of justice
from another state).
20. Schack v. State, 202 So. 2d 824 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967) (no right to bail after judgment of conviction has been reviewed and approved on appeal); Sanders v. State, 184 So.
2d 686 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966) (bail denied where defendant did not include record of lower
court proceedings so that the appellate court could judge whether the lower court had
abused its discretion); A.N.E. v. State, 156 So. 2d 525 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963) (bail not
appropriate pending appeal of juvenile proceedings because of statutory provisions that
an adjudication of delinquency by juvenile court is not deemed a conviction, a finding of
guilt, or a finding of criminality); Gammage v. State, 154 So. 2d 712 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963)
(no right to bal pending appeal from denial of motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
sentence); Harrington v. State, 114 So. 2d 217 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959) (no right to ball because
no issue reviewable under the constitution by the supreme court); DeConingh v. City of
Daytona Beach 103 So. 2d 233 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958) (municipal court has no discretion to
deny supersedas bond on appeal from municipal court judgment resulting in imprisonment
in the city jail).
21. 208 So. 2d 147 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
22. Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962) (bail denied
even if appeal might not be frivolous or taken for delay because of defendant's threats to
the Government's principal witness).
23. United States v. Davis, 37 F.R.D. 450 (D. Colo. 1965) (bail denied on appeal because
of danger and likelihood that defendant would once again rely on wholesale narcotic sales
as a means of livelihood).
24. Vauss v. United States, 365 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (bail denied because of no
sufficient out-patient service to obviate defendant addict's potential danger to society).
25. United States ex rel. Estabrook v. Otis, 18 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1927) (bail denied
because defendant sent poison through the mails in an attempt to poison a judge and
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There are other examples, but these should be sufficient to illustrate the
disadvantages to the community that might result from a rigid and restrictive
application of Younghans.
The problem of discretion exercised above and beyond a set standard
has been dealt with on a broad scale by the federal courts. 2

6

Since July 9,

1956, the federal standard governing bail pending appeal has been that "Bail
may be allowed pending appeal or certiorari unless it appears that the appeal
is frivolous or taken for delay." 2 7 Under the previous standards the federal
courts did not hesitate to exercise their discretion to deny bail even when a
"substantial question" was present.2 9 When the standard
was changed from

"substantial question" to one of "frivolity and delay," 30 the
question of
discretion extending beyond the standard was raised once again. The new
federal standard received its first test in United States v. Allied Stevedoring
Corp.

1

The question

to which

the district court

addressed itself was

"whether in the absence of frivolousness or delay, admission to
bail becomes
mandatory," 32 and the court concluded that "even if the appeal were not
frivolous or dilatory, these defendants should not be admitted to bail."2 3
To justify the denial the court listed several reasons in addition to frivolity
and delay: (1) both defendants were uncooperative; (2) one defendant had
a serious criminal record; (3) release on bail would inflict a wrong on the
law-abiding community; (4) considerable motivation for the defendants to
flee; and (5) an attempt to intimidate witnesses during the trial . 4 On
appeal 5 the court of appeals admitted that it did not entirely understand the
new standard, but cautiously affirmed the district court's denial of bail and
found it to be an "exercise of sound judgment and wise policy."3 6 On further
appeal3l Mr. Justice Frankfurter, acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice,
acknowledged the Government's suggestion that there might be grounds for
denial other than frivolity and delay and indicated that "the Government is
rightly cautious in suggesting the extent of the area of discretion that still
danger that defendant would again commit another crime of like character if released).
26. See, e.g., discussion of cases cited notes 22, 23, 24, 25 supra.
27. FaD. R. CRIM. P. 46 (a) (2). This rule replaced a rule that "Bail shall not be allowed
pending appeal unless it appears that the appeal involves a substantial question which
should be determined by the appellate court." 292 U.S. 659, 664 (1934).
28. Id.
29. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280 (Jackson, Circuit Justice, 1950), expressed
the view that the presence of a "substantial question" did not make bail pending appeal
mandatory. Id. at 282. This approach meant the absence of a substantial question automatically denied bail, whereas the presence of such a question merely permitted the court
to exercise its discretion.
30. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46 (a) (2).

31. 143 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Allied had previously been considered under
the "substantial question" test by Mr. Justice Frankfurter as Circuit Justice, 76 S. Ct. 1068
(1956), but was remanded for application of the new tests of frivolity and delay.
32. United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 143 F. Supp. 947, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
33. Id.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id at 952.
United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 235 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1956).
Id. at 910.
Ward v. United States, 76 S. Ct. 1063 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice, 1956).
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remains under the amended rule."3 8 Frankfurter avoided a direct statement
concerning how much discretion remained under the new rule and confined
himself to the estatement that: "Elaboration of whatever occasions for discretion may remain had better be left to the specific occasions which may
give rise to such claims."' 9 Without comment on the other reasons cited by
the district court Frankfurter denied bail on the single ground of defendants'
likelihood of flight from the court's jurisdiction. Since this initial, cautious
interpretation of the amount of discretion available under the new rule,
however, the federal courts have not hesitated to exercise freely their discre40
tion to deny bail pending appeal in nonfrivolous, nondilatory cases.
The Bail Reform Act of 196641 altered the federal standard of post conviction bail. In addition to frivolity and delay, the factors of flight from the
jurisdiction, danger to other persons, and danger to the community were
added as considerations. 42 This addition, in effect, did nothing more than
express by legislation some of the factors the courts already had been considering.43 There is, however, a significant change in wording: "If such a
risk of flight or danger is believed to exist, or if it appears that an appeal is
frivolous or taken for delay, the person may be ordered detained." 4 Although
additional tests have been written into the federal standard by legislation,
the courts have been given discretion to release even where all of the tests are
met. This is a legislative reversal of the previous judicial standard 45 and is
accomplished by granting the courts a wide range of alternatives to replace
the old dichotomy of bail or jail.46 The federal courts have been instructed
by Congress to seek alternative ways of guaranteeing a defendant's presence
at trial if ordinary bond posting is deemed insufficient either in capital cases
or after conviction. 47 Confinement in a hospital or other institution, confinement with provisions for daytime release, and release with a provision for
outpatient care have been suggested as acceptable alternatives to bail.48 The
Bail Reform Act of 1966 should have a far-reaching effect upon federal bail
38. Id. at 1065.
29. Id.
40. See, e.g., discussion of cases cited notes 22, 23, 24, supra; Leigh v. United States, 82 S.
Ct. 994 (1962); United States v. Bentvena, 308 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1962) (Warren, Circuit
Justice). For an excellent summary of considerations that the federal courts have developed
to guide their discretion, see United States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 725, 740 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
The court in Piper also takes the position that any doubts should be resolved in favor of
the defendant.
41. 18 U.S.C. §3148 (Supp. II, 1965-1966).
42. Id.
43. See United States v. Piper, 227 F. Supp. 735 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
44. 18 U.S.C. §3148 (Supp. H, 1965-1966) (emphasis added). Section 3148 creates a
presumption for release providing that the individual may be detained if "circumstances
indicate that release would not be advisable." 2 UNITED STATES CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADAInNsTRATIvE

NEvs 2305 (1966).

45. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280 (Jackson, Circuit Justice 1950).
46. 18 U.S.C. § §3146, 2148 (Supp. H, 1965-1966).
47. 18 U.S.C. §3148 (Supp. I, 1965-1966) governs both defendants charged with capital
offenses and defendants who have been previously convicted of an offense.
48. Stinnett v. United States, 387 F.2d 228, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The circuit court
remanded for failure of the district court to consider any other alternative except bail or
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practices, but it is too early to assess its full impact, and it is not without

49
problems of interpretation on the matter of discretion.
The federal courts' treatment of the problem of discretion and the impact
of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 provide an excellent point of reference from
which to consider Florida's post conviction bail standard. The trial court in
the instant case' ° clearly felt it was acting within its authority in denying
bail even though the tests of Younghans v. State" were met. But the Florida
Appellate Rules"2 impose the Younghans standard upon lower courts with
such finality that the district court of appeal"a was justified in its strict interpretation of the standard. Thus, the root of the problem is the Florida
Appellate Rule, which seems to require strict adherence to Younghans. Now
that the issue has been decided by the instant case, it seems clear that the
Younghans standard is not adequate to protect society's interest in detaining
certain individuals who may threaten society even though they meet the
standard. An easy solution would be simply for the Florida supreme court
to declare 54 that lower courts may utilize discretion beyond Younghans. But
this would be no better than the discretionary situation existing prior to
Younghans. 5" The idea of a standard to guide lower courts is sound. There is
always a danger that courts will grant or withold discretionary privileges for
extra-legal reasons,' 6 especially if the alleged crimes have political implications. But the standard must be broad and sufficiently flexible to achieve an
adequate and just balance between the needs of society and the rights of the
individual. The power bestowed upon the federal judiciary by the Bail
Reform Act of 196657 provides a standard, yet allows room for judicial
discretion. It provides the courts with a broad array of alternatives to bail
to guarantee the presence of the defendant for trial. Florida needs to revise
its standard for bail pending appeal and should consider the federal model.

FRED W.

POPE, JR.

jail. In United States v. Ursini, 276 F. Supp. 993, 998 (D. Conn. 1967), the court, recognizing that bail can be denied only in extraordinary circumstances, denied bail to convicted robbers on the ground that "there are no conditions of release . . . which will
reasonably assure that these defendants will not flee or pose a danger to any other person
or to the community." But see United States v. Erwing, 268 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
In Erwing the court, in a display of judicial conservatism, interpreted the Bail Reform
Act of 1966 as not changing the previous judicial interpretation of the court's discretion to
deny bail. Without any consideration of alternatives to bail, the court revoked bail on the
traditional ground of danger posed to the community by a narcotics peddler.
49. Id. These cases indicate a need for a definitive interpretation of what the Bail
Reform Act of 1966 has done to federal judicial discretion in capital and post conviction
cases.
50.

State v. Waller, No. 16,743 (6th Cir. Fla. Jan. 11, 1968).

51. 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956).
52. FLA. App. R. 6.15 (b).
53. Waller v. State, 208 So. 2d 147 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
54. FLA. CONsr. art. V, §3 provides that "The practice and procedure in all courts shall
be governed by rules adopted by the supreme court."
55. See, e.g., discussion of cases cited note 12 supra.
56. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 283 (Jackson, Justice, 1950).
57. 18 U.S.C. §§3146, 3148 (Supp. II, 1965-1966).
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